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INTRODUCTION
Pro-se defendant Douglas E. Larsen hereby submits his petition for rehearing of appeal pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

Defendant states that this petition is

presented in good faith and is not interposed for delay and
relies upon specific material facts and points of law which
defendant believes the court must further consider.
IV
MATERIAL FACTS
1.

This appeal stems from a default judgment that was

issued in case No. 940013590-CV in the Circuit Court in favor of
plaintiff N.A.R., LC. on or about December 7, 1994.

(Ref.

Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "C".)
2.

That default judgment was taken unbeknown to defendant

Larsen after plaintiff N.A.R., LC. and Mr. Larsen entered into a
negotiated settlement of the matter and Larsen had forwarded a
full and final settlement payment on October 20, 1994.

(Ref.

Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "D".)
3.

That plaintiff accepted the final settlement payment

which specifically denominated settlement terms and cashed the
money order by depositing it into the N.A.R., LC. bank account.
(Ref. Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "A".)
4.

That plaintiff fraudulently altered the settlement terms

by "blacking out" the restrictive terminology contained on the
postal money order prior to depositing it into the N.A.R., LC.
account.

(Ref. Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "B".)

5.

That plaintiff N.A.R.f LC. hid the fact that the money

order had been altered from defendant Larsen, thereafter.

(Ref.

Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "D".)
6.

That plaintiff had failed to ever properly serve summons

and complaint to defendant Larsen and failed to complete proper
service even though it was advised of that fact.

(Ref.

Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "D".)
7.

Plaintiff further proceeded with its pattern of

negligent behavior by intentionally forwarding notice of default
judgment to an incorrect address.

(Ref. Appellant's Brief,

Exhibit "G".)
8.

The Circuit Court refused to set aside default judgment

without hearing on July 6, 1995.

(Ref. Appellant's Brief,

Exhibit "K".)
9.

The Utah Court of Appeals upheld the Circuit Court's

default judgment, without hearing, based solely upon the review
of the service of process question on March 7, 1996.

(Ref. March

7, 1996, Appellate Court Decision.)
V
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLATE COURT DECISION WAS
BASED SOLELY UPON THE SERVICE OF
SUMMONS QUESTION.
The Appellate Court rendered its decision based upon the
assertion that service of process was adequate under Rule 4(j),
U.R.C.P., which involves "refusal of copy."

In fact, defendant

Larsen did not refuse to accept a copy of the process, as is
suggested.

Defendant Larsen was never properly served

(Ref.

Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "D", para. 3 ) , that when he became
aware of the complaint he settled the claim (Ref. Appellant's
Brief, Exhibit "D", paras. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9 ) , that he never
personally received any document from N.A.R., LC. until the
motion and order in supplemental proceedings was served upon him
in May, 1995, (Ref. Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "D", para. 8 ) .
Plaintiff's process server admits the following in
affidavit:
1.

That she attempted service at the office building of

defendant on October 24, 1994, and October 26, 1994.

(Ref.

Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "F", paras. 1 and 2.)
2.

That the office was not open to the public and "someone"

unknown to her was seen inside the premises.

(Ref. Appellant's

Brief, Exhibit "F", para. 3.)
3.

That Ms. Draper did not approach anyone, no one

conversed with Ms. Draper and no one either accepted or refused
service.
4.

(Ref. Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "F", paras. 3 and 4.)
That Ms. Draper dropped the papers in the mail slot at

the office address.

(Ref. Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "F", para. 4.)

In business associate Murleen Hewitt's letter to plaintiff,
dated October 27, 1994, are the following statements:
1.

That Ms. Hewitt had been at a trade show during the

prior two (2) days and discovered the summons on the office floor
on October 27th.
2.

(Ref. Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "E", para. 1.)

That Douglas Larsen was out of town prior to October

24, 1994, and would not return until November 7 or 8, 1994.
(Ref. Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "E", para. 1.)

3.

That Ms. Hewitt suggested that service should be

completed upon Mr. Larsen's return after November 8, 1994.

(Ref.

Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "E", para. 1.)
The facts of the matter fail to make any showing that
plaintiff completed service or even attempted service pursuant to
Rule 4(e)(1) and 4(g). Further, no material facts of any sort
exist to support Rule 4(j) claims wherein it must be shown that
Mr. Larsen refused to accept a copy of process.

In fact, a

showing was made that Mr. Larsen wasn't even in Salt Lake City at
the time Ms. Draper allegedly saw "someone" in the office and
dropped the summons through a mail slot.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT PROPER
SERVICE WAS NEVER ATTEMPTED.
Rule 4(e)(1), U.R.C.P., calls for service of an individual
"At the individual's dwelling house or usual place of abode with
some person of suitable age and discretion there residing, or by
delivering a copy of the summons and/or complaint to an agent
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process."
In fact, no attempt was made to serve Mr. Larsen at his
dwelling house or usual place of abode, no person of suitable age
or discretion was served and no agent was authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.

By definition,

this complaint involved a claim for the performance of dental
work upon Mr. Larsen and clearly calls for personal service.

A

POINT III
RULE 4(g), U.R.C.P. SQUARELY ADDRESSES
THE ISSUES WHICH CONTROL THE MATTER.
While references were made to New York state and federal
case law, Rule 4(g), U.R.C.P., directly addresses plaintiff's
allegation that the person to be served was avoiding service of
process instead of Rule 4(j). Under Rule 4(g), "Where there
exists good cause to believe that the person to be served is
avoiding service of process, the party seeking service of
process may file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an
order allowing service by publication, by mail or by some other
means.

The supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts made

to identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the
circumstances which make it impractical to serve all of the
individual parties."
The rules clearly and specifically call for actions under
Rule 4(g) that were not undertaken by plaintiff in this instance
and thereby invalidate the faulty service that was undertaken.
By its own terms under Rule 4(g), this paragraph "permits the
court to fashion means of service reasonably calculated to
apprise the parties of the pendancy of this action" and the
requirement of a specific court order of substituted service
"must itself be served so that the party served will be able to
determine the sufficiency of service and the time as of which his
or her response is due."

This case reflects a classic example of

what transpires when the applicable rules of civil procedure are
ignored.

POINT IV
THE REFERENCED CASE LAW DEFINES
DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES.
While the Errion v. Connell case as cited does support Rule
4(j), U,R.C,P., this decision is different from the action at
bar.

In the Errion case personal service was deemed to have been

completed pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at
the defendant Amy Errion's dwelling house or usual place of
abode, that defendant Amy Errion personally refused service, and
the process server advised defendant's brother, identified as
Fred Errion, (a person of suitable age and discretion) that he
was completing service upon defendant by leaving summons with
Fred Errion.
In the current action, the undisputed evidence submitted to
the court reflects the facts that the process server approached
the business offices of Mr. Larsen rather than his residence
address, specifically identified no one, communicated with no
one, and pushed the papers through a mail slot.

No evidence

exists to show that Mr. Larsen ever refused service or that
service was ever attempted upon any person of suitable age and
discretion.

In fact, evidence exists to show that Mr. Larsen was

not even in Salt Lake City at the time service was attempted.
The Penney, Inc. vs. I.S. Laboratories, Inc. and Bossuk v.
Steinberg cases also address service of process matters where
defendants were approached in person, identified by the process
server, and slammed the door upon the process server, thus
knowingly and willfully refusing to accept process.

In the instant action, the process server left the summons
at an office complex wherein Mr. Larsen was only one of many
people who utilized the building, service was not specifically
attempted or completed upon either Mr. Larsen or a person of
suitable age or discretion and when noticed of these facts,
plaintiff failed to complete proper service.
The Federal Court held in Milligen v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463, 61 S. Ct. 339, 342, 85 L. Ed.2d 278 (1940), that the
governing constitutional principle is the due process requirement
that the mode of service be "reasonably calculated to give defendant actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be
heard, or more specifically, that the means of notice must be
such as one desirous of actually informing the defendant might
reasonably adopt to accomplish it.

See Graham v. Sawaya, 632

P.2d 851, 854 (Utah 1981), wherein it was held that the due
process clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions
require notice to a party before his or her rights are affected
by a judgment.

A requirement of actual notice must be shown for

an in personam judgment, not just a showing that the means of
notice employed was the best available in the circumstance.
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 70 S. Ct. 652, 94 L. Ed. 865 (1950), it was held that:
But when notice is a person's due, process
which is a mere gesture is not due process.
The means employed must be such as one
desirous of actually informing the absentee
might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.
Objective review of this action reflects the fact that, upon
determining that a claim was going to be initiated, Mr. Larsen
not only did not seek to avoid the matter, but contacted N.A.R.,

LC. directly, negotiated a settlement with plaintiff and
forwarded full and final payment of the debt on October 20, 1994,
six (6) days prior to the attempted service of summons.

Mr.

Larsen relied upon the settlement agreement and acceptance of
payment by N.A.R., LC. thereafter and had no reason to suspect
that plaintiff would initiate a scheme to undertake double
recovery.
In the Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. case, 339
U.S. at 314, it was determined that the heart of the due process
clause is the individual's right not to be deprived of property
or liberty without an opportunity to present a defense and that
right has little remedy or worth unless one is informed that the
matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appeal or
default, acquiesce or contest.
POINT V
SET ASIDE OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT
IS JUSTIFIED.
Defendant believes the larger issue in this appeal involves
the appropriateness of setting aside default judgment based upon
the matters of double jeopardy, fraudulent alteration of a U.S.
money order, and a pattern of plaintiff's wrongful conduct, in
addition to the question of proper service of summons.
The Utah courts have consistently held that default
judgments are not lightly taken as they do not resolve matters
based upon merit.

Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 545

P.2d 507 (Utah 1976); Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 377 P.2d
189 (Utah 1962) .

Under these circumstances, valid questions of material fact
exist to justify the set aside of default judgment in this action
that must not be ignored by the Court of Appeals.

Case law

reflects the fact that relief from default judgment has routinely
been granted upon any reasonable excuse of a defaulting party.
See Westinghouse Elect. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contracor,
544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975); Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney
Corp., 545 P.2d 507 (Utah 1976).

In this instance, defendant

Larsen has factually supported substantial questions of material
fact which call for set aside of the default judgment in this
matter.
VI
CONCLUSION
There is no question that based upon the facts of the
matter, the applicable rules of civil procedure and case law,
that defendant Douglas E. Larsen is entitled to set aside of the
default judgment in this matter.

Careful review of the facts, as

alleged by the parties in this action, clearly reflect the fact
that defendant has not fully and fairly received his due process
rights in this action when one considers either reasonable and
equitable grounds or the technical aspects of the law.

Utah

courts have consistently rendered such decisions on the side of
defendants wherein contentious issues of material fact exist,
especially in regard to default judgments.
Defendant respectfully requests the court to reconsider
defendant's appeal based upon this information.

DATED this / /

day of March, 1996.

D0UGLA2T E. LARSEN
Defendant/Appellant Pro Se

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing PETITION FOR REHEARING was mailed first class, postage
prepaid, to plaintiff/appellee1s attorney, Mark T. Olson, 10
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day of March, 1996.
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